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This article examines implications of 
the deployment of the US ballistic missile 
defense (BMD) system in the Baltic and 
Nordic regions. These implications are to 
be considered to ensure Russia’s military se-
curity. Using the structural-functional me-
thod, the authors analyse the internal 
structure of the US BMD in Europe, stages 
of its implementation, and its influence on 
the military equilibrium in the region. Being 
similar to other regional missile defence 
systems of the Pentagon, the BMD in Euro-
pe increases the offensive capabilities of 
the US armed forces and its allies and in 
doing so, it stops performing a purely de-
fensive mission declared by Washington. It 
is stressed that the deployment of mobile 
sea- and land-based BMD elements in the 
Baltic Sea region and Nordic countries will 
inevitably destabilize the strategic situation 
and may lead to a new round of arms race 
in the region. The efficacy of BMD in 
Europe is evaluated from the perspective of 
military technology. The system’s potential 
threats to Russia’s military security and its 
armed forces are assessed. The article con-
siders measures to enhance national secu-
rity that could be taken by Russia provided 
the US plans to deploy BMD in Europe are 
fully implemented. 
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Introduction:  
BMD in the current US strategy 
 
The problem of BMD is not new in 
international relations. It dates back to 
the Cold War. However, in recent years, 
it has gained an increased importance 
in view of Russia’s deteriorating rela-
tions with the US and the West in gene-
ral. Today, the problem of BMD is playing 
a key role in security policy at the glo-
bal, regional, and national levels. 
At the global level, missile tech-
nology and systems have gained wide 
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currency. They are available even to non-state actors. The missile non-
proliferation regime proved of little efficacy. According to the US, the total 
number of ballistic missiles in the world is 5,900 units, excluding the arse-
nals of great powers [34]. In today’s world politics, missile weapons blur the 
line between weak and strong states, making their relations less predictable. 
The situation aggravated after the US unilateral abrogation of the 1972 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. The treaty and SALT I were the cor-
nerstone of stability during the Cold War, imposing limitations on the devel-
opment of both offensive and defensive missile systems. Thus, on the US 
initiative, the BMD problem was withdrawn from the control of international 
law. It may have led to potential global destabilisation. What are the reasons 
behind these changes in Washington’s policy? 
At the national level, the current US military strategy focuses on the ad-
vanced development of BMD systems, which will intercept a missile 
launched by any potential enemy. It will give the US an opportunity to 
launch a pre-emptive attack using nuclear or conventional warheads. [13] 
BMD systems are not only a means of defence, but also an integral part of 
the US strategic offensive capability. [11; 12] Therefore, it is not surprising 
that US officials stress that they will not support major restrictions on the 
development of their BMD. 
Laying claims to global leadership, the US strives to create a global 
BMD system which includes the national BMD and regional BMD subsys-
tems for protecting their own territory. [13] Regional systems set up in col-
laboration with allies should increase the capabilities of national BMD sys-
tems through creating a layered defence architecture. At the same time, the 
US guarantees the security of regional allies and increases its military and 
political influence. 
At the regional level, the deployment of BMD systems will inevitably 
provoke other states into increasing their nuclear missile potential. [14; 15] 
This does not only heighten military and political tensions but also acceler-
ates arms race in missile technology, precision-guided munitions, communi-
cation systems, and space weapons. 
The US gives the Baltic Sea (BSR) and Nordic (NR) regions an impor-
tant role in the creation of the BMD system. What military strategic goals 
does Washington have? What is the structure of the US BMD system in 
these regions? How does the Pentagon plan to further develop BMD in BSR 
and NR? What measures should Russia take in view of these plans? This ar-
ticle is an attempt to answer these questions. 
 
BMD in Europe: An overview 
 
The official goal of the BMD in Europe is protecting Europe and the US 
from a missile attack by Iran and Syria. The US opposes any restrictions on 
the BMD in Europe. At the same time, representatives of the US and NATO 
stress that the BMD system in Europe is not targeted at Russia and empha-
sise its limited capability to intercept modern intercontinental ballistic mis-
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siles (ICBMs). Western experts and politicians declare that the BMD in 
Europe does not provide protection against a massive nuclear attack by Rus-
sia or China. Therefore, it is not a threat to Russia’s strategic missile force 
(SMT). 
However, prior to solving the problem of Iranian nuclear programme, the 
US Secretary of State John Kerry and the then Secretary of Defence Chuck 
Hagel stated that a deal with Teheran did not eliminate the need to further 
develop BMD in Europe. [24; 32] A. Rasmussen, the Secretary General of 
NATO, revealed the actual intentions of the US, ‘The purpose of NATO’s 
missile-defence system is to defend Europe against a real threat. At least 30 
countries around the world either have ballistic missiles, or are trying to ac-
quire them. The know-how needed to build them is spreading, and their 
range is increasing, with some missile systems from outside the Euro-Atlan-
tic region already capable of targeting European cities’. [31] This means that 
it may be aimed against the Russian SMT. 
A general cooling in the Russia - US relations and the Ukraine crisis ag-
gravated the situation. Earlier, BMD focused on threats from Iran and Syria, 
and Russia was a potential partner in ensuring European security. Today, 
cooperation with Russia is rarely considered given the deployment of the 
BMD system in Europe. Moreover, the rhetoric on Russia became tougher. 
Statements by the Deputy Secretary-General of NATO A. Vershbow [29] 
and hard-line members of Congress, as well as proposals from neo-
conservative ‘think-tanks’ such as the Heritage Foundation [23] more and 
more often view Russia not as a partner but rather as an adversary that 
should be contained by the BMD in Europe. Finally, the US National Secu-
rity Strategy (published in February 2015) named Russia as an aggressor. 
[28, p. 2, 4, 19, 25]  
As to the technological aspects, the BMD in Europe consists of ships 
carrying the Aegis combat system, radars, SM-3 interceptors, Aegis Ashore 
equipped with SM-3, THAAD anti-ballistic missile system, Patriot 3 air de-
fence system, and drones and communication satellites. The system is de-
signed to exchange data on missile launch parameters with the US national 
BMD, thus creating a layered defence system. Early warning radars with a 
5,000 km range are deployed on the Aleutian Islands, in California, Massa-
chusetts (US), the UK, Greenland, Norway, and Japan. Moreover, there are 
special radars for detecting false targets within a range of 2,000 km that can 
move by sea to the threatened area. The task of detecting launches and en-
suring communications between all BMD elements is done by space satel-
lites. 
The BMD plans of the Obama’s administration were published in 2009 
in a document entitled the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). 
President Obama announced that the plan of the previous administration to 
deploy 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and a radar installation in the 
Czech Republic had been abandoned. Instead, a new BMD architecture was 
proposed. It will use mobile sea- and ground-based anti-ballistic systems. 
BMD elements deployed on the territory of European states and in the adja-
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cent waters will be included into a larger system called BMD in Europe or 
the NATO missile defence system. The development of the BMD system in 
Europe is divided into four phases (see table 1).  
 
Table 1 
 
Key phases of BMD in Europe 
 
Phase Deployment date BDM elements 
Phase 1 2011 Deployment of BMD systems against short- and mid-
range missiles, AN/TPY-2 radars potentially com-
patible with radars in Alaska and California; putting 
in service 23 ships carrying the Aegis system and 111 
SM-3 Block IA interceptors. Deployment of Aegis-
equipped ships in the Mediterranean. 
Phase 2 2015 Modernisation of BMD systems against short and 
mid-range missiles; deployment of land-based Aegis 
components and more advanced SM-3 Block IB in-
terceptors. Providing protection for the South of 
Europe from potentially possible missile launches 
from Iran and Syria. Target numbers are 41 Aegis and 
341 SM-3 units. 
Phase 3 2018 Modernisation of BMD systems against mid- and 
intermediate range missiles. Deployment of a land-
based Aegis complex in Poland and more advanced 
SM-3 block IIA interceptors. BMD in Europe provi-
des protection for all European NATO members from 
missile attacks. 
Phase 4 2020 Modernisation of the BMD against IC missiles 
through deploying most recent SM-3 Block IIB inter-
ceptors. Russian ICBR become potential targets. 
 
However, on March 15, 2013, the then US Secretary of Defence Ch. 
Hagel announced the restructuring of EPAA. Phase 4 was postponed until 
after 2020. Instead, it is planned to deploy 14 additional ground-based inter-
ceptors in Alaska and an additional AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan. [22] In his 
statement, Ch. Hagel did not mention abandoning the fourth phase of EPAA — 
a decision made in view of a reduction in the US military spending and cer-
tain technical problems. In the future, the US can return to the project. How-
ever, there are other more important reasons to restructure the BMD in 
Europe, which relate to the inefficiency of the system and the need to rede-
sign it. [27]  
 
BMD in Europe and the Baltic Sea Region 
 
An important part of the BMD in Europe is being deployed in the Baltic 
Sea region, and Phase 3 of EPAA is to be positioned in Poland. The adopted 
changes in Phase 3 concerned only the types of interceptor systems. Slower 
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SM-3 Block IIA interceptors will be deployed in Poland in 2018 instead of 
SM-3 Block IIB interceptors, whose upgrading was suspended by the US 
Congress. Some Russian experts believe that this will not have a significant 
effect on the tactical and technical features of the anti-missile system [9], 
since interceptors can be replaced later. 
It is planned to deploy 48 SM-3 interceptors in the settlement of 
Redizikowo in northern Poland. Moreover, Poland’s Minister of Defence 
announced the creation of a national mobile BMD system by 2023. It will 
complement the BMD system in Europe. If necessary, the Polish BMD sys-
tem will be placed under the NATO command. Polish experts argue that ‘the 
investment in a national BMD system is the best protection from Russia’s 
missile ‘blackmail’. The US expressed its willingness to cooperate with Po-
land in creating the country’s national BMD. [35] 
Moreover, Washington and Warsaw reached an agreement on the de-
ployment of the US Patriot-3 air defence systems at a 100 km distance from 
the Russian border. An additional protocol to the agreement with Poland 
transforms an earlier limited interceptor facility into a full missile defence 
system equipped with a radar, command points, and logistics support (article 
IV). [10] It is planned to station several hundred US armed forces personnel. 
Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are active proponents of local 
missile defence unions brought together by a pronounced anti-Russian sen-
timent. In April 2012, presidents of these countries discussed the construc-
tion of a unified system of ballistic missile defence in response to the grow-
ing asymmetric nuclear missile threats given an increase in Russia’s missile 
potential in the Kaliningrad region. [8, p.137]  
The most radical anti-Russian sentiment relating to the BMD systems are 
found in Poland and the Baltics. Poland strives to assume the leadership in 
security not only in the Baltic Sea region, but also in Eastern and Central 
Europe in general. The Polish leaders view the US and NATO as guarantors 
of regional security. In August 2014, they asked NATO to retarget the BMD 
system at Russia. This proposal was justified by the fact that Lithuania, Lat-
via, Estonia, and Poland felt threatened by Russia after the Ukraine events. 
At the summit in Wales, the NATO leadership declined this proposal, un-
willing to adopt an openly anti-Russia position. Germany did not support the 
decision and called it ‘an unnecessary provocation’. [19] 
The US call for a more active European participation in the BMD pro-
grammes. [33] It is trying to convince the allies that the upgraded BMD in 
Europe project stands out for its flexibility, combining land- and sea-based 
mobile BMD elements. This makes it possible to respond promptly to all 
threats coming from different directions. 
The US is also interested in placing the emerging European missile de-
fence system under the command of NATO. Firstly, this will allow the US to 
share financial liabilities with the allies. The ‘old’ NATO members (Ger-
many, France, Italy, etc.) expect that their contribution to the BMD system 
will be symbolical. However, the US does not intend to pay for the construc-
tion of expensive BMD systems on their own. [2] 
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The US will benefit from placing the BMD system under the control of 
NATO, since this will ensure greater legitimacy in international law and dis-
guise the actual American control over the BMD systems. Moreover, the US 
plans to secure their military and political influence on their European part-
ners by using NATO, since it is impossible to do so through the EU. 
 
BMD and the Nordic countries 
 
The US is trying to involve countries outside the military alliance — 
Finland and Sweden — in the NATO and BMD. Before the Ukraine crises, 
these states held a rather moderate position, taking into account Russia’s in-
terests and concerns. However, after the Crimea and Donbass events, the 
ideas of containing Russia and acceding to NATO are becoming increasingly 
popular in these countries, especially in Sweden. [16]  
In 2011, the Netherlands expressed its willingness to join the BMD in 
Europe and equip four ships with the Smart-L radar systems. [4] In 2014, 
Denmark purchased Patriot-3 air defence system and stated its intention to 
join the BMD system. [20] Officially, Copenhagen says that joining the 
BMD in Europe programmes is not an action targeted against Russia but ra-
ther an attempt to ensure protection ‘against rogues states, terrorist organisa-
tions and others that can potentially launch missiles at Europe and the US’. 
After the Ukraine crisis deepened, Denmark officially confirmed that it 
would contribute to NATO’s attempts to contain Russia. It is planned to re-
equip several frigates with newest radars, which will make it possible to in-
clude them later into the European missile defence system. [21] 
Some Nordic states hold a special position in the context of the BMD 
programmes, since some of them, namely, Denmark (through Greenland) 
and Norway, are part of the NORAD, which ensures the aerospace and mis-
sile defence of the US and Canada in the North. This infrastructure is tradi-
tionally associated with the Russia-US missile containment dating back to 
the Cold War. A NORAD radar was installed in the town of Qaanaaq (earlier 
Thule, Greenland). In 2004, with the permission from Denmark, it was mod-
ernised to suit the purposes of BMD. A decision was reached to enlarge the 
military base in Kangerlussuaq in western Greenland. Norway also has the 
experience of long-term BMD cooperation with the US. Since 1998, the 
Norwegian town of Vardø has housed the Globus II radar installation associ-
ated with a radar operating in the UK. Globus II has a range of 4500 km, 
which makes it possible to receive data on almost all missile test-launches in 
Russia and to control the Arctic Ocean. 
US military specialists study opportunities for deploying sea-based BMD 
systems using Aegis-equipped fleets in the waters adjacent to Greenland and 
Svalbard. Experts from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (UK) 
believe that, in this case, Russia’s SMT will be in a very vulnerable position 
in terms of a retaliatory attack against the US, since the ballistic trajectories 
from Russia to North America is very close to the north Pole. [26, p.93]  
Despite an advanced BMD infrastructure, the development of a system 
for detecting launches from Russian strategic nuclear submarines remains a 
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major problem for the US. The US plans to integrate a system for surveil-
lance of Russian submarine missile carriers into the BMD systems. The Pen-
tagon’s Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency set up a special pro-
gramme for creating a surveillance system in the Arctic Ocean. Unlike the 
earlier surveillance systems, it will include sensors fixed on not only the sea-
floor but also the ice surface of the Arctic. [17] 
 
How will Russia respond? 
 
The deployment of the BMD elements in the Baltic Sea region and Nor-
dic countries presents challenges to Russia’s military security. To estimate 
them, it is important to take into account the total capabilities of the US 
BMD after the completion of Phase 3 of the EPAA.  
The key problem is the vulnerability of Russia’s SMT. [15] In a short-
term perspective, the efficacy of the US BMD at both the global and the 
theatre of operations levels is insufficient to intercept the latest Russian To-
pol-M, Bulava, and Yars ballistic missiles. For instance, Yu. Solomonov, a 
designer of ballistic missiles, believes that, in the best case, the Aegis system 
is capable of intercepting ‘tactical level objects and even those with some 
reservations’ but not ICBM. [7, p. 85—86] None of the US BMD subsys-
tems (Aegis, THAAD, GBI, Patriot-3) has the capacity to intercept Russian 
missiles with separable warheads, capable of manoeuvring, interfering with 
electronic warfare equipment, and sending false targets. Today, the US sys-
tems are capable of intercepting only several ICBM launched by Iran or North 
Korea. These are single warhead missiles without penetration aids. [6, p. 21] 
Russian experts believe that penetration aids, developed in Russia are the 
key factor reducing the efficacy of the US BMD. These aids are capable of 
passing through the BMD system and they are more effective than the ones 
the US is planning to create by 2020. [1; 15] A simple increase in the num-
ber of modern US fixed and mobile BMD elements in Poland and the Baltic 
and the Barents Seas will not provide sufficient protection in case of a mas-
sive launch of Russian ICBMs. Moreover, Russian missile launching sys-
tems located to the east of the Urals will remain unattainable. 
The most serious threat to Russia’s security is the information compo-
nent of the US BMD — radars, communication and command systems. Con-
siderable danger lies in the advanced development of the US space commu-
nication system, which services not only BMD but also other precision-
guided munitions. The US already has early warning radars completely cov-
ering the northern hemisphere. It means that the information systems sup-
porting BMD will be oriented to intercepting ballistic missiles, whose trajec-
tories pass through the Arctic. The US Globus II radar alone makes it possi-
ble to obtain data on ballistic missiles launched on a territory stretching from 
Plesetsk to Kamchatka. [3] 
It seems that the only real threat to Russia’s military security is the inter-
ception of Russian ICBMs before the separation of warheads in the boost or 
ascent phase. In this case, the most probable scenario is a US attempt to 
carry out a pre-emptive attack against Russia’s SMT and to neutralise them 
using sea-based BMD elements. [18] 
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A pre-emptive attack is not very probable due to Russia’s containment 
capabilities. On the other hand, interceptors launched from Europe will not 
fulfil the task of ‘finishing off’ the Russian SMT. In practice, this would 
mean that the US would deploy BMD systems and sea-based radars in the 
Baltic and Barents Seas in advance, which would not go unnoticed by Rus-
sia. Deployed troops and munitions will become an easy target for both Rus-
sian cruise missile and land-based missile fire systems. Therefore, it will be 
almost impossible to prepare such an attack clandestinely. Supporting a large 
ship group in the Arctic requires adapting the equipment and ships to the se-
vere climate of the Arctic. Moreover, high latitudes are associated with 
communication problems, and the US satellite groups is not yet capable of 
ensuring stable communication and target assigning. Additional problems 
would be caused by the absence of large military bases for maintenance re-
quired in case of prolonged presence in the Barents Sea. 
The probability of such scenario is low in the current conditions. More-
over, the strategic interests of the US Ministry of Defence are increasingly 
focused on the Pacific Rim. This is corroborated not only by military doc-
trines, but also by the actual redeployment of the US overseas troops and 
munitions. By 2020, 60 % of the US troops and munitions will be engaged in 
controlling the so-called Southern Arc stretching from the Persian Gulf 
through the Strait of Malacca to North Korea. The number of tactical attack 
and long-range aircraft in the Pacific Rim region is increasing; 2,500 ma-
rines are temporarily stationed in Australia. [30, p. viii, 16—17, 34—35] 
The regional BMD system created by the EU in collaboration with Japan and 
Israel is designed to neutralise threats from Iran, China, and North Korea. 
Although further deployment of the BMD in Europe will not neutralise 
Russia’s SMT in a foreseeable perspective, it will result in an increase in the 
presence of naval and air forces in the region. [5, p. 75—86] In general, the 
development of the global BMD system will play a destabilising role until 
Russia and the US pursue the policy of mutual nuclear containment, first of 
all, in the Arctic. Further development of the BMD system, which will not 
be abandoned by Washington [25, p. 25—26] and is strengthening the US 
strategic potential will inevitably result in the balancing behaviour of not 
only Russia, but also other potential adversaries, which will increase the con-
flict potential on a global scale. 
The BMD problem is aggravated by artificial politicisization, the 
Ukraine crisis as well as by the anti-Russian vector of the Baltics’ security 
policies. The Nordic countries — Norway, Denmark, and Sweden — are 
also prone to use the NATO and BMD to exert influence on Russia. Obvi-
ously, the US policy aimed at the development of regional BMD systems 
creates challenges to Russia’s military security today and in the future. The 
question remains: what is the optimal response to prevent challenges from 
transforming into a real military threat to Russia. The current situation sug-
gests that, in the near future, the US plans to create an effective national or 
regional BMD system will not be fulfilled due to financial and technological 
reasons. [13] This should be taken into account by Russia when developing a 
relevant strategy. It is important to avoid ‘alarmist’ attitudes, which can lead 
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to not only high economic costs but also negative political repercussions. 
Ultimatum-like pressure on the US and demands to withdraw the BMD sys-
tems from Europe will not yield any positive results. There is a need for a 
compromise over limitations of functional capabilities of the BMD systems 
deployed near Russian borders. There is also a need for confidence-building 
measures. Without denying the political component, it seems that experts in 
military technology have to be given a voice when reaching decisions at the 
national level. 
From the military and strategic perspective, special attention should be 
paid to the Arctic region. It is important to develop the Northern Fleet’s ca-
pabilities to respond to the activities of submarine fleets, troops, and BMD 
elements of potential adversaries, as well as to ensure clandestine patrolling 
of Russian strategic nuclear submarines. This means fulfilling tasks associ-
ated with traditional containment.  
The BMD in Europe will require special attention if the US revisits the 
idea of implementing Phase 4 of the EPAA and increases the velocity per-
formance of interceptors (above 5 km/s). This will be possible provided the 
suspended SM-3 Block IIB is completed and the number of Aegis-equipped 
ships in the northern seas is significantly increased. In this case, it will be-
come possible to intercept Russian missiles in the boost phase. However, the 
recently published recommendations of the Pentagon experts suggest stop-
ping the financing of boost phase interceptors as showing little promise. [27, 
p.15] Today’s interceptors can be effective only in local operations against 
such adversaries as Iran and North Korea. 
Moreover, when formulating a response, it is important to take into ac-
count factors increasing the vulnerability of Russia’s SMT. [15] First of all, 
it is the infrastructure for detecting, tracking, and analysing Russian ICBM 
launches developed by the US and its allies. This includes: 
— constructing advanced long-range radars and their sea-based mobile 
variants; 
— advanced development of the military satellite group for the BMD 
purposes; 
— improving the regional and global BMD automated process control 
system, which, in perspective, will make it possible to use offensive power 
more efficiently for both neutralising strategic objects of a potential enemy 
through a preventive strike and engaging conventional strategic forces; 
— creating and promoting regional BMD elements, which will allow the 
US to strengthen military and political ties with states in all strategic regions 
of the world. 
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